Training and the Private Sector: International Comparisons by Masanori Hashimoto
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Training and the Private Sector
Volume Author/Editor: Lisa M. Lynch
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-49810-7
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/lync94-1
Conference Date: December 15-17, 1991
Publication Date: January 1994
Chapter Title: Employment-Based Training in Japanese Firms in Japan and
in the United States: Experiences of Automobile Manufacturers
Chapter Author: Masanori Hashimoto
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8779
Chapter pages in book: (p. 109 - 148)4  Employment-Based Training in 
Japanese Firms in Japan and in 
the United States: Experiences 
of Automobile Manufacturers 
Masanori Hashimoto 
4.1  Introduction 
The international competitiveness of the American economy is a critical pol- 
icy concern for the United States. The key  factor behind an internationally 
competitive economy is the ability of its labor force to adapt flexibly to contin- 
ual innovation and to produce high-quality products at low cost. Such ability 
is fostered by  training. The underlying assumption of  this paper is that the 
stream of successful Japanese products in recent years owes much to effective 
private-sector training in Japan. 
Recently, many American firms have adopted Japanese practices, such as 
the just-in-time inventory (kanban)  system, the team-based production system, 
quality control circles, and training by job rotation, and the trend is likely to 
continue. Also, Japanese direct investment in the United States has risen sub- 
stantially in recent years and may grow in the future. Yet, there has been little 
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systematic discussion of how Japanese-style  training and employment rela- 
tions function and how suitable they are to the American labor force. An under- 
standing of Japanese training promises  to offer  valuable  policy  lessons for 
improving the competitiveness of the American labor force. To help promote 
such understanding, this paper presents an economic theory of  training and 
uses it to assess the initial experiences of Japanese automobile transplants in 
transferring  Japanese  employment  and  training  practices  to the  American 
labor force.’ 
Since much of  the information in this paper pertains to the automobile in- 
dustry, it is useful to first note how this industry’s productivity characteristics 
differ across the two countries. Fortunately, the relevant information is readily 
available in a recent publication summarizing the findings from a large project 
conducted at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Womack, Jones, and 
Roos 1990). It has been said that automobile workers in Japan require fewer 
hours of  work to assembly a car, and produce higher quality cars, than their 
U.S. counterparts. The MIT study confirms this claim: in  1989 Japanese as- 
sembly plants built an automobile using 16.8 hours of labor on average, Japa- 
nese transplants in North America used 20.9 hours, and US.-owned plants in 
North America used 24.9 hours. The number of assembly defects per 100 vehi- 
cles averaged 52.1 for Japanese plants, 54.7 for Japanese transplants, and 78.4 
for U.S. plants.2 
There is, of  course,  considerable  diversity  in  assembly  productivity  and 
quality within Japan as well as within the United  state^.^ In fact, the best U.S.- 
owned plant in North America  outperformed the worst plant in Japan:  18.6 
hours for the U.S. plant  versus  25.9 hours for the Japanese plant.  An  eye- 
opener is that the best US.-owned plant evidently produced cars of  slightly 
higher quality (35.1 defects) than the best Japanese plant (37.6 defects) (Wo- 
mack et al. 1990,84-88).  The evidence seems incontrovertible, however, that 
on balance Japanese automobile plants rank highest in both productivity  and 
quality, followed by Japanese transplants, and then by US.-owned plants in 
North Ameri~a.~ 
I. The focus on the automobile industry is meaningful, since in recent years about two-thirds 
of U.S. trade deficits with Japan have been attributed to automobile imports. Also, many aspects 
of Japanese manufacturing methods, e.g., “lean production,” developed in this industry, and in 
particular at Toyota. 
2. The defect figures are from the J. D. Power Initial Quality Survey as reported in Womack et 
al. (1990, fig. 4.4) and refer to defects traceable to the assembly plant, as reported by  owners in 
the first three months of use. 
3. Assembly hours ranged from 13.2 in the best plant in Japan to 25.9 in the worst plant. For 
Japanese transplants in North America, comparable figures were 18.8 and 25.5, respectively, and 
for U.S.-owned plants in North America, 18.6 and 30.7, respectively. See Womack et al. (1990, 
fig. 4.3 and 4.40). 
4. The same MIT study shows that US-owned plants in North America required on average 
fewer hours to assemble a car than plants in Europe or in newly developing countries. Defects 
were slightly fewer in plants in those countries than in US.  plants, though more than in Japanese 
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Perhaps most significant for the current study is the finding that workers in 
Japanese transplants in North America, most of whom are American, produced 
at a quality level comparable to that in Japanese plants. Interestingly, transplant 
workers and workers  in Japan receive  similar  amounts of  training,  far ex- 
ceeding what workers in U.S.-owned plants receive, at least during the initial 
period of employment: new production workers in Japanese transplants receive 
an average of 370 hours of training as compared with 380 hours for workers in 
Japanese plants and a mere 46 hours for workers in U.S.-owned plants5  The 
above findings suggest that nationality per se is not what explains the differ- 
ence in productivity  between  assembly  workers  in Japan  and those in the 
United States. Rather, training, employment relations, and production organi- 
zation-e.g.,  mass production  versus lean production-are  likely to be the 
explanatory factors.6 
This paper views employment-based training as the primary vehicle for de- 
veloping  productive  workers.  What  are  the  key  features  of  a  productive 
worker? The following remark by Alfred Marshall, from a chapter on indus- 
trial training penned  more than a hundred years ago, remains to this day a 
fitting description of a productive worker: “To be able to bear in mind many 
things at a time, to have everything ready when wanted, to act promptly and 
show resource when anything goes wrong, to accommodate oneself quickly to 
changes in detail of the work done, to be steady and trustworthy, to have always 
a reserve of  force which will come out in emergency, these are the qualities 
which make a great industrial people.”’ 
The creation of the “great industrial people” that Marshall talked about re- 
quires close coordination  between formal schooling and employment-based 
training.8  Moreover,  the  Japanese  experience  suggests  that  effective 
5. See also McDuffie and Kochan (1991) for a related discussion on training in automobile in- 
dustries. 
6.  The main conclusion of the MIT project is that “lean production,” a term coined by  one of 
the project’s investigators, is preferable to mass production (Womack et al., 1990). Most Japanese 
automobile manufacturers are said to practice lean production, as are other Japanese manufactur- 
ers. The just-in-time inventory (kunbun) system, team-based production, kaizen (continuous incre- 
mental improvements) practice, quality control circles, and active worker participation-e.g.,  any 
worker who detects problems can stop the assembly process by  pulling a cord-are  some of the 
key features associated with lean production. According to the MIT study, the lean production 
method realizes the benefits of mass production (low unit cost) and of traditional craft production 
(quality), because it “transfers the maximum number of tasks and responsibilities to those workers 
actually adding value to the car on the line, and it has in place a system for detecting defects 
that quickly traces every problem, once discovered, to its ultimate source. . . . Mass production is 
designed with buffers everywhere-extra  inventory, extra space, extra workers-in  order to make 
it function. . . . In old-fashioned mass-production plants, managers jealously  guard information 
about conditions in the plant, thinking this knowledge is the key to their power” (Womack et al. 
1990, 99, 103).  This last point is pertinent to this study, as my theory in section 4.2 treats reliable 
information exchange as the basis for productive employment relations. 
7. Alfred Marshall, Principles ofEconomics (New York: Macmillan, 1920), book 4, chap. 6. 
8. My focus in this paper is employment-based training in private-sector firms. Dore and Sako 
(1989) offer comprehensive discussions of the Japanese school system, vocational and technical 
training, and on-the-job training. 112  Masanori Hashimoto 
employment-based training must include not only technical training but also 
training in employment relations. The benefits from investing in  technical 
skills are straightforward; indeed, most writers on training issues have focused 
on this type of training. Training in employment relations teaches employees 
how  to communicate effectively with co-workers, how to share information 
and responsibilities, and how to teach fellow workers, as well as how to deal 
with conflict. Although such training may be difficult to measure, to ignore it 
would be to stop short of gaining a full understanding of training issues. 
The emphasis on training in employment relations is especially appropriate 
when contemplating policies to strengthen U.S. industries. One often hears that 
promoting job security for American workers is fundamental to developing a 
productive work force. Although such a recommendation may have merit, job 
security should not hinder efficient separations. An  employment-at-will ar- 
rangement, which is typical in both U.S. and Japanese labor markets, ensures 
separations occur if efficient. The problem is that, as my theory below demon- 
strates, inefficient separations also occur from time to time. An important pur- 
pose of training in employment relations is to reduce inefficient separations to 
a minimum. In the concluding section, I argue that this type of training should 
be an important component of  policies on human resource management in 
American companies. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents a theory of training; 
sections 4.3 and 4.4 use the theory to discuss hiring and training practices in 
Japan and at some of the Japanese transplants in the United States. Section 4.5 
offers concluding remarks. 
4.2  A Theory of Training 
4.2.1  A Nontechnical Outline 
The theory presented in this section aims to clarify the links between school- 
ing and training, and between technical training and training in employment 
relations. Figure 4.1 gives an overview of my conceptual frame~ork.~  The em- 
ployer and the employee are assumed to invest in training in order to enhance 
the value of  their relationship. Figure 4.1 distinguishes between two types of 
training, indicated in circles: (1) training to enhance the employee’s technical 
skills and (2) training in employment relations. The independent variables are 
indicated in figure 4.1 as the costs associated with these investments. The cost 
of  training in employment relations reflects the environment-the  extent of 
heterogeneity of the work force, its ability to function cooperatively as a group, 
management attitudes, worker propensity for mobility, and other “cultural” 
9. This conceptual framework is adapted from my recently formulated theory of employment 
relations in Japan (Hashimoto 1990b). which is an  extension of my earlier work (Hashimoto 198  1; 










Fig. 4.1  Outline of the theory of training investments 
factors (arrow a). Figure 4.1  indicates that the environment is shaped in part 
by formal education (arrow b). Also, the cost of training in technical skills is 
a function of how well basic education prepares students for training (arrow 
c). The next several paragraphs will develop these ideas further. 
It is well known that workers with better academic skills are more efficient 
learners on the job.1° Mastery of such basic subjects as language and mathe- 
matics, as well as the development of  a positive attitude toward continuous 
learning on one's  own, is a prerequisite for efficiency in postschool technical 
training (fig. 4.1, arrow c). Also, as noted earlier, training in technical skills is 
facilitated if new employees arrive with solid basic skills that vary little among 
the employees. If every new employee comes equipped with a solid basic edu- 
cation, the time needed to teach technical skills on the job is reduced, because, 
for example, independent study can be relied on for much of technical train- 
ing." In Japan, there is a tradition in which older, experienced persons teach 
and nurture young, inexperienced persons. Teachers who produce capable stu- 
dents are amply rewarded. As will be discussed later, this tradition appears to 
have been carried over to modem industrial training in Japan, thereby lowering 
the cost of technical training there (fig. 4.1, arrow d). 
In  addition to teaching basic skills, formal schooling teaches students to 
10. Bishop (1990)  finds that competence in science, language, arts, and higher level mathemat- 
ics indeed is associated with success in training and high performance in hands-on-work sample 
tests. See section 4.3 for a discussion of the relationship between schools and employers in Japan. 
11. See section 4.3 for a discussion of independent study in Japan. Also, the time saved can be 
directed to training in employment relations. 114  Masanori Hashimoto 
become good “citizens” by instilling in them skills and attitudes for effective 
group functioning through cooperation. This way, good formal schooling helps 
shape the environment, thereby affecting the cost of  training in employment 
relations (fig. 4.1, arrows b and a). In Japan, formal education teaches tradi- 
tional Japanese notions of the individual’s place in society and of the coopera- 
tive attitude (Rosenbaum and Kariya 1989). Schoolchildren, for example, are 
taught from their earliest years to perform cooperative chores, such as serving 
school lunches and cleaning the classroom at the end of the day. This way, 
schools inculcate students with attitudes that employers look for in new re- 
cruits (Sako 1990). 
According to figure 4.1, both types of investment reinforce each other. Thus, 
decreasing the cost of investing in technical skills increases investment in these 
skills,  and in turn  stimulates investment in employment relations  (fig. 4.1, 
arrow e). Decreasing  the cost of training in employment relations increases 
investment in such training, which in turn stimulates investment in technical 
skills (fig. 4. I, arrow f). As another source of interdependence, an exogenous 
increase in the benefits of technical skills increases investment in employment 
relations, and vice versa. 
Figure 4.1 shows that economic growth and technological progress can stim- 
ulate both types of investment (arrows g and h). This prediction points to the 
link between training and macroeconomic and industrial policies. One might 
conjecture that the training incentive in Japanese firms was fostered in large 
part by the success of the macroeconomic and industrial policies in that coun- 
try (see the comparative statics later in this section). 
4.2.2  Technical Aspects 
The following discussion addresses the key technical aspects of my theory; 
for details, see Hashimoto (1992). Training investments are assumed to be firm 
specific. I focus on one aspect of investment in employment relations, namely, 
investment in information reliability. By information reliability I mean the abil- 
ity to quickly disseminate reliable information among members of a firm. I 
emphasize information reliability because information becomes asymmetrical 
once investments are made. As a result, wealth loss may occur from ex post 
opportunism. The ability to reliably exchange information within an employ- 
ment relationship reduces such wealth loss. Such ability is determined by the 
background environment (see fig. 4.1). In particular, a favorable environment 
is assumed to be characterized by  a more elastic marginal cost, as well as a 
low marginal cost, of investment (see the comparative statics later). 
Contract flexibility is central to my model of training. It increases the returns 
to training investments, by allowing quick adjustments to newly emerging con- 
ditions. For analytical convenience, I distinguish among three types of con- 
tracts. An ideal contract would stipulate that all relevant new information be 
incorporated at once into contractual arrangements. The value of an ideal con- 
tract is denoted by M*.  A rigid contract would stipulate that no new informa- 115  Employment-Based Training in Japanese Firms in Japan and the US. 
tion be incorporated until the contract comes up for renewal. The value of a 
rigid contract is denoted by M,. Ajlexible contract permits some adjustments 
to new information to be made automatically during the life of the contract. 
The value of  a flexible contract is denoted by  MTI2 Although the model is 
formulated in terms of wage flexibility, the analysis of  flexibility in other di- 
mensions of employment relations will be similar in spirit. 
The model assumes that the employee and the employer enter into an em- 
ployment relationship in the first period by  specifying the wage schedule and 
the amounts of investment. Investments are assumed to take place during the 
first period. At  the beginning of  the second period, productivity is revealed, 
and the parties decide whether to stay together or to separate. In an ideal con- 
tract, the parties easily agree on the realized values of productivity, no asym- 
metry of information exists, and all separations are efficient. If information is 
asymmetric, an ideal contract may  not be feasible. In employment relation- 
ships, information asymmetry seems inevitable: the employer is likely to be 
better informed about the employee’s contribution to the firm, and the em- 
ployee is better informed about his alternative value.13 Moreover, each party 
may have an incentive not to reveal information truthfully. Since investments 
are assumed to be firm specific, the parties in this case will share the invest- 
ments in order to reduce inefficient separations caused by information asym- 
metry (Becker 1962; Kuratani 1973; Hashimoto 1981).’“ 
If information is asymmetric, an ideal contract is infeasible, and the parties 
choose between rigid and flexible contracts. With either contract, inefficient 
separations occur, reducing the incentive to invest in the employment relation- 
ship.I5  With a rigid contract, the parties agree not to exchange information in 
the second period. In a flexible contract, the parties try to reduce inefficient 
separations by agreeing on at least the approximate values of the productivity 
magnitudes, and, as a result, some exchange of information takes place. The 
information so exchanged, however, will contain “errors of measurement,” 
Let us represent the extent of  errors of measurement by a.  My analysis re- 
sults in the following general form for the expected value of a flexible contract: 
(1)  M, =  M* -  +(a),  where +(O)  = 0, +(a) > 0, and +’ > 0, 
12. For mathematical expressions for M*, M,, and M,, as well as other magnitudes of the model, 
see Hashimoto (1992). 
13. In this model, I assume that only the employer knows the true inside productivity and only 
the employee knows the true alternative productivity. 
14. An  interesting new  result of  my  model is that if  the variance of the inside productivity 
increases relative to the variance of the alternative productivity, the optimum worker share is in- 
creased. This result hinges on the fact that, though increased uncertainty in inside productivity 
raises the overall wealth loss from inefficient separations, it lowers the ratio between wealth loss 
due to dismissals and the loss due to quits. As a result, it becomes optimal to raise the employee’s 
sharing ratio, in order to let it do more of the work, as it were, of reducing the loss from inefficient 
quits. See Hashimoto and Lee (1992) for details. 
15. Inefficient separations take place when parties separate even though the employee’s human 
capital has greater value inside than outside the firm. 116  Masanori Hashimoto 
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Fig. 4.2  Contract frontier 
where M* is the value of an ideal contract. Note that M2  approaches M* as u 
approaches zero. The parties choose between rigid and flexible contracts by 
comparing their expected contract values. Such a comparison is represented as 
a contract frontier, M,  written as: 
(2)  Ih =  Max (MI,  M2). 
The contract frontier is illustrated in figure 4.2. Since there is no exchange 
of information in a rigid contract, MI is independent of u.  For small values of 
u,  M2  is greater than M,, and the flexible contract dominates.16  As u  increases, 
M2  falls: the more errors of measurement there are, the lower the returns to 
investment. The value of M2  eventually becomes equal to MI  at 6. Beyond 6, 
M2  is smaller than M,,  and the rigid contract dominates. The contract frontier 
is kinked at 8,  the threshold variance. 
Investment in Firm-speci$c  Technical Skills 
with the exogenous marginal cost, w', of producing h: 
(3)  M =  w'(h), 
where w' (h)  is the marginal cost of  investment. This cost is incurred at the 
time the contract is signed. Figure 4.3 portrays the relevant magnitudes. 
Obviously, the greater M, or the smaller o',  the larger the optimum h. If  a 
flexible contract were chosen, a reduction of u  would increase Ih  (=M2)  and 
would increase the optimum h.I7 To sum up the main points so far: the smaller 
the u,  the more likely that a flexible contract is chosen; if a flexible contract is 
chosen, the smaller the u,  the larger the optimum h. 
The optimum investment in technical skills, h, is determined by equating M 
16. If u is zero, $I equals M, which in turn equals M*. 
17. If  a rigid contract were chosen, u would not affect $I,  and so the optimum h  would be 








h'  Investment(h) 
Fig. 4.3  Investment in technical skills 
Investment in Employment Relations 
Parties may reduce u  by  spending resources on screening job  applicants, 
decreasing the asymmetry of information, and improving the quality of com- 
munication. Call this activity an investment in -IT.  The cost function for this 
investment is given by: 
(4)  A =  A(@ -  u), h(0)  = 0,  A' 2  0, 
where  @ is the value of  u that would prevail if no resources were spent on 
reducing it.'8 Equation (4) states that cost is a positive function of the amount 
of u  reduced and that marginal cost is upward sloping. The total return to this 
investment is given by: 
(5)  R(u,h) = 0,  for 6 I  u I  @, 
> 0,  R, < 0,  R,  > 0, for 0 I  u < 6. 
Obviously, this investment is made only when a flexible contract is chosen. 
In that case, the parties solve the following program: 
(6)  Maxn = R(a,h) -  h(B -  a)  =  M,h -  o(h) -  A(@ -  a). 
c+,h 
The first-order conditions for the optimum are: 
(74  ant ah =M* -  =  0, 
(7b)  an t a(-  a)  = aM,h  t a~  + auau = 0. 
Equation (7a) equates the marginal revenue of h with the marginal cost, and 
equation (7b) equates the marginal revenue of  -u  with the marginal cost. 
18. The threshold variance, 6, is assumed to be less than 6. If 6  < 6,  then the flexible contract 
will always dominate. 118  Masanori Hashimoto 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the solution. The function R’ is the marginal revenue 
associated with -u, where h* is the optimum value of h, and A’ is the marginal 
cost. The marginal revenue is zero until u is reduced by  (@ -  G),  becomes 
positive at that point, and is specified for simplicity to be horizontal until u is 
reduced completely to zero, i.e., (6  -  a)  =  0.  Three outcomes are depicted in 
figure 4.4, which depend on the marginal cost function, A‘.  If the marginal cost 
is A:,  it does not pay to reduce u at all, and a rigid contract is chosen. If the 
marginal cost is A:,  u  is reduced entirely by @,  and an ideal contract is adopted. 
If the marginal cost is A; or A:,  the error is reduced by (@ -  a*),  and a flexible 
contract is chosen. 
In a competitive equilibrium, the investment costs, w  + A,  as well as the 
benefits, are shared between the parties, to make their individual profits zero 
in the long run. The employee may pay for his share of the cost either by ac- 
cepting a lower wage than warranted by his productivity, in the first period, or 
by paying an “entrance fee” at the time of employment (Becker 1962; Kuratani 
1973; Hashimoto 1981). Although investments in technical skills and employ- 
ment relations lead to long-term  employment  attachment,  the above model 
guarantees that efficient separations always take place as long as each party 
retains the right to separate. 
4.2.3  Comparative Statics Discussion 
Given the R’ function, lowering the marginal cost, A’,  increases information 
reliability and therefore increases contract flexibility. Given the A‘ function, 
lowering the marginal cost of investing in h will increase investment in -u  by 
MC, MR 
in Errors 
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shifting R’  upward. Also, the more elastic the X’ function, the greater the in- 
crease in investment in -u  that would result from an upward shift in R’. 
The marginal cost function, X’,  is shaped by the background environment 
(see fig. 4.1). I argue that a more favorable environment is associated with a 
greater elasticity, as well as a lower level, of the marginal cost of investing in 
information reliability. A more elastic marginal cost means that an increase in 
investment in -u  entails a smaller increase in total cost. Thus, an upward shift 
of R‘  increases investment more, the more elastic the A’ function. In figure 4.4, 
if  marginal cost were  Xi,  an upward  shift of  R’ would  increase the amount 
invested in -u more than if  marginal cost were  XL.  An improvement  in the 
marginal  returns,  therefore,  stimulates investment  in  information  reliability 
more in a more favorable environment; that is, such an improvement interacts 
with the quality of environment in affecting the investment. Also, the two in- 
vestment types interact with each other: the lower the marginal cost, the more 
that is invested in  -IT, which raises M2.  An increased M2,  in turn, stimulates 
investment in h. 
An autonomous increase in h induced by a downward shift in o’  may stimu- 
late investment in -u by raising R‘. Given the marginal cost A:  in figure 4.4, 
for example, it initially does not make sense to reduce u.  However, it is easy 
to visualize the R’  function shifting upward enough to make it attractive to 
begin reducing u.  Obviously, if it made sense to reduce u  to begin with and if 
u has not already been reduced to zero, an increase in h will lead to a further 
reduction in u. 
Japanese workers are said to invest more in the employment relationship, 
and have more flexible contracts, than U.S. workers (Hashimoto and Raisian 
1989; Mincer and Higuchi 1988; Hashimoto 1990b).I5’  Also, work organization 
and industrial relations in Japan have been found to exhibit greater flexibility 
than those in most other developed countries (Hashimoto 1990b). These find- 
ings can be understood as reflecting Japan’s more favorable environment for 
investing in both h and -u,  characterized by lower and more-elastic cost func- 
tions. 
Another result concerns the effect of technological progress on the incentive 
to invest in the employment relationship. The effects of technological progress 
on Japanese investments in firm-specific human capital and on earnings have 
received some attention in the literature (Tan 1987; Mincer and Higuchi 1988). 
A uniform productivity increase, widespread throughout the economy, can be 
shown to increase the incentive to invest in h and in -u  by shifting R’ in figure 
4.4 upward without affecting the investment costs (Hashimoto 1992). 
The above result suggests a reason Japanese investment in employment rela- 
19. Large Japanese investments in -u  are indicated by such time-consuming measures as joint 
consultations and consensus-based decision making (nemwushi).  According to several American 
managers of Japanese automobile transplants in the U.S. Midwest, the time-consuming process of 
consensus building is one of  the major adjustments that Americans have to accept to work in the 
“Japanese-style’’  work environment. 120  Masanori Hashimoto 
tions became pronounced in the 1960~.~O  That was the period when technology 
changed rapidly and the growth rate of the economy began to accelerate. An 
important development was the launching of a productivity enhancement cam- 
paign to increase Japan's  international competitiveness by  importing modem 
technologies from the United States and Europe.21  The campaign, coordinated 
by  the Nihon  Seisansei  Hombu  (Japan  Productivity  Center) established in 
March 1955, helped guide private industries to acquire modem Western tech- 
nologies, thereby leading the way to the double-digit growth rate of  the Japa- 
nese economy during the 1960~.~~  Major labor unions and leftist politicians 
initially opposed the campaign vigorously, fearing that modern technologies 
would displace labor and cause high unemployment. The campaign eventually 
gained support from unions and politicians based on three principles: (1) to 
prevent unemployment of workers who would be made redundant by new tech- 
nologies (the principle of job security), (2) to promote joint consultations be- 
tween management and labor concerning the introduction of new technologies 
and related matters, and (3) to promote a fair sharing of the gains of new tech- 
nologies among employers, workers, and consumers. Joint consultations and 
unemployment prevention have become ubiquitous features in the landscape 
of Japanese industrial relations. 
Given the historical background of  the campaign, it is reasonable to view 
the economic growth and technological change of the late 1950s as exogenous, 
for my model. The high rate of economic growth in the early  1960s further 
stimulated the investment in technical skills. The increased demand for techni- 
cal skills, in turn, raised the benefit from increased information reliability, and 
this process was  boosted by  the low-transaction-cost  environment that pre- 
vailed in Japan. These investments helped foster a strong sense of identification 
with, and commitment to, the company on the part of  both the management 
and the worker (Cole 1979,253). 
4.3  Private Sector Training in Japan 
The theory just presented indicates that training in technical skills and train- 
ing in employment relations (information reliability) reinforce each other. The 
relative importance of these training investments is determined mainly by the 
20. Such Japanese practices as joint consultations, consensus-based decision making, and enter- 
prise unionism became widespread only after the late 1950s (Hashimoto 1990b). 
21. An extensive treatment of the history of this campaign appears in Nihon Seisansei Hombu 
(1988). See also Nihon Sangyo Kunren Kyokai (1971). 
22. The campaign included conferences and seminars in which top-level industrialists, bankers, 
scholars, and bureaucrats participated, numerous visits by Japanese managers and unionists to the 
United States and Europe, as well as visits by Western specialists to Japan, and active information 
dissemination. Between 1955 and 1956, for example, 42 missions involving 481 members were 
sent to observe various U.S. industries. See Nihon Seisansei Hombu (1988, chap. 4). Another 
organization, Nihon Sangyo Kunren Kyokai (Japan Industrial Training Association), was estab- 
lished in 1955. It was responsible for introducing the case-study method of the Harvard Business 
School to Japan in the mid-1950s. 121  Employment-Based Training in Japanese Firms in Japan and the U.S. 
cost functions reflecting the background environment. This theory serves as an 
organizing framework for understanding some of  the practices at Japanese 
firms in Japan and in the United States. The discussions in the following two 
subsections  are  based  in  part  on  information  obtained  by  interviewing 
management-level employees, both Japanese and American, at some Japanese 
transplants, as well as at Honda Motors in Japan. Appendix A provides profiles 
of these companie~.~~ 
Our theory stresses the link between schooling and training. The relative 
role of schooling and employment-based training in creating productive work- 
ers differs among countries and among industries within a country. Overall, 
since the end of World War 11, the Japanese approach to building a productive 
work force has relied heavily on employment-based training, and the U.S. ap- 
proach more on training offered by  outside sources, such as vocational and 
professional schools and training institutions (Stern 1990). The Japanese ap- 
proach, in my view, reflects the importance placed on training in employment 
relations rather than merely on technical training.” 
In  figure 4.1,  the background environment  is  shown to  critically affect 
private-sector training. It has been reported, with a tone of  disapproval, that 
the Japanese felt it “most efficient to have a homogeneous work force which 
they believe has the same values and behavior” (Gelsanliter 1990, 94-96).  My 
analysis suggests that an emphasis on homogeneity has economic validity. Ho- 
mogeneity in literacy and numeracy, in willingness to learn new skills and to 
teach others, and in the ability to function as team members lowers the costs of 
investments in both technical skills and employment relations.25  In this context, 
recall that science achievement test scores have been found to have greater 
coefficients of variation, as well as lower averages, in the United States than in 
Japan.26  With a work force that is homogeneous in its basic knowledge and in 
23. The characteristics discussed here are more visible among large firms. Large-firm practices 
tend to serve as the benchmark for small and medium-sized firms in Japan, however. Since most 
of the executives at Japanese transplants have been with their parent companies in Japan for over 
10 years, they were well informed about employment and training practices at various Japanese 
companies. They could also offer their first-hand evaluations of how Japanese approaches may 
work with the U.S. labor force. 
24. I hasten to add that vocational and technical schools do exist in Japan. See Dore and Sako 
(1989) for a informative discussion of Japanese schools, and see Levine and Kawada (1980) for 
an informative discussion of the role of industrial training in Japanese economic development. 
25. The homogeneity argument may be appreciated with my model in the following manner: 
with worker heterogeneity in d  and in the w and A functions, employers would have to devise a 
separate contract for each employee or adopt standardized contracts, which would be suboptimal 
for any given employee. An  American manager at a Japanese automobile transplant observed, 
“managers in Japan share a common background with their employees so that they, the managers, 
just have to point to the right direction and things get done. In America, managers have to do more 
to get the job done.” A Japanese manager at another Japanese automobile transplant recalled that 
even differences in physical size among American workers posed a challenge in installing machin- 
ery in such a way as to minimize physical strains. In Japan, where the distribution of body sizes is 
compact, a given machine setting tends to be appropriate for a large number of workers. 
26. For example, a recent international comparison of science achievement found the following: 
in a sample of young teenagers (mean age  14.7 in Japan, 15.4 in  the United States), the mean 122  Masanori Hashimoto 
its willingness to learn new skills, employers can rely on on-the-job learning 
and self-study to train new employees.27 
To digress, let me note an example of what appears to be a U.S. historical 
precedent  in  investment in  employment  relations.  Henry  Ford’s celebrated 
Five-Dollar-a-Day program, introduced in 1914, contained an element of  in- 
vestment to deal with worker heterogeneity. In the early 1900s, most of Ford’s 
workers were recent arrivals to Detroit, and many were new immigrants: in 
1915 more than 50 languages were spoken at Ford’s Highland Park plant (Wo- 
mack et al. 1990, 30-31).  In my view, Ford made two types of investments in 
employment relations to deal with worker heterogeneity. First, it is well known 
that he introduced an extreme division of labor in his mass production system 
(Raff 1988). Such an arrangement reduced, if not eliminated, the necessity for 
workers to communicate with one another. Second, Ford introduced a system 
of inspection and certification to homogenize workers with respect to certain 
productivity attributes. Thus, according to Raff and Summers ( 1987), some 
150  Ford Sociological Department inspectors visited the homes of  all workers 
in order to inculcate them with Ford values and to certify them for the Five- 
Dollar-a-Day program.28 
Recruitment is the first important step in creating the right work force for 
successful training. Most hiring in Japan takes place in spring when students 
graduate from high schools and colleges. New hires arrive ready and malleable 
for employment-based training. Japanese employers stress academic achieve- 
ment in their hiring decisions, in contrast to the U.S. situation where academic 
achievements  rarely  serve  as  a hiring  criterion  (Bishop  1990).29  In  Japan, 
science score (with the coefficient of variation in parentheses) was 20.2 (24.8 percent) for Japan 
and  16.5 (30.3 percent) for the United States. In the tabulations for other age groups, as well as 
for separate scores in biology, chemistry, and physics, the Japan-United States differences in the 
mean and the coefficient of variation persist. See International Association for the Evaluation of 
Educational Achievement (1988). Bishop (1990) summarizes international comparisons of  test 
scores in science and mathematics. 
27. As Dore and Sako (1989.80) put it, Japanese basic education “produces people capable of 
following carefully detailed and complex written instructions. . . .  This means that a lot of learning 
is based on informal production of job specifications and procedure manuals meticulously written 
out by supervisors and used as teaching material for self-teaching by newcomers to a job. You do 
not just stand by Nelly; you read what Nelly has thoughtfully and meticulously written about what 
she knows.” 
28. A Ford pamphlet told workers about the importance of taking baths, living in clean, airy, 
well-lighted, and uncrowded surroundings, and saving to buy one’s own house. Excessive drinking, 
gambling, untidiness, consumption of unwholesome foods, and lack of enthusiasm for regularly 
saving money were all potential grounds for exclusion from the program (Raff and Summers 1987, 
S70-S71). According to Raff (1988,399), “the Ford Motor Company, through its famous Sociolog- 
ical Department, was at considerable pains to tell its employees how to think about its benefi- 
cence.” 
29. One possible reason for this phenomenon is that grades from American schools are not 
uniform in quality from school to school. In effect, grades contain too much “noise” to be useful 
to an employer. Since the Japanese education system is governed by  the Ministry of Education, 
the content of courses in Japan is much more uniform among schools than is the case in the United 
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schools, which are in the best position to judge students’ achievements, per- 
form much of the screening through “semiformal” arrangements with specific 
employers. Many employers have established ongoing relationships with par- 
ticular high schools to help recruit their graduates year after year.’O  In hiring 
for production and clerical jobs, for example, employers, especially large ones, 
rely extensively on the recommendations from high  These recom- 
mendations are based mostly on academic achievements (Rosenbaum and Ka- 
riya 1989). In some cases, employers also administer their own tests, though 
this practice has become less common recently, given the shortage of  high 
school graduates. 
New recruits in Japanese firms receive concentrated orientation sessions in 
safety and corporate culture @do) followed by intensive training in technical 
skills.3z  Training does not end there, however. It continues throughout an em- 
ployee’s tenure in the firm. An employee becomes trained while working side 
by  side with experienced workers and participating in consensus-based deci- 
sion making and in such team activities as quality control circles and sugges- 
tion systems. In Japan, both informal and formal training lead to concrete re- 
wards  to  the  employees.  According  to  a  recent  comparative  study  of 
manufacturing employees, employees in Japan experience significantly greater 
pay increments as a result of training than do those in the United States (Kal- 
leberg and Lincoln 1988). 
At Honda Motors in Japan, high school graduates spend one month in orien- 
tation training, learning safety and company philosophy. They then enter the 
shop floor for another month in which about 50 percent of their time is spent 
on technical training and the rest on production. Informal on-the-job training 
takes over afterward. After eight to ten years, they are evaluated and sorted 
into technical or management tracks, each track offering further training. Most 
college graduates are sent to the main office, where they are trained for a multi- 
tude of tasks, including sales and shop-floor technical skills. 
Partly because of worker homogeneity in basic knowledge, much technical 
training in Japan relies on self-study by workers: they are asked to study manu- 
als or books on their  At Honda Motors, for example, workers are also 
30. A management-level employee at Honda in Suzuka, Japan, told me that Honda does in fact 
have such arrangements with several high schools. However, it also sends out recruiting brochures 
to other schools as well. Rosenbaum and Kariya (1989) report that in an area near Tokyo a typical 
high school had semiformal arrangements with about 77 employers, which is only a little over 11 
percent of all employers who send job offer forms to this school. However, these  11 percent of 
firms hired almost half of  all the work-bound graduates from this school. 
31. This practice has an  “experience rated” feature. Employers assign different size quotas to 
schools depending on their previous experiences with the school (Rosenbaum and Kariya 1989). 
32. The emphasis on safety is ubiquitous in Japanese firms and transplants, perhaps underscor- 
ing the desire to protect investments in human capital. 
33. It would appear, therefore, that the usual measure of training investments, in terms of time 
spent on the job, understates total training resources devoted to the formation of on-the-job human 
capital in Japan. The self-study phenomenon in Japan implies that the total resources that firms 
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encouraged to keep a diary of what they learned on the job and to write down 
questions they want to ask the next day.34  A manager at a Japanese automobile 
transplant indicated that with the American work force he cannot rely on self- 
study for technical training, partly because the diversity in the level of  basic 
knowledge among the workers makes such an approach an unreliable device 
for training. 
Training in employment relations is much less circumscribed than technical 
training. It requires much time to be spent on sharing information among mem- 
bers of the firm. In this regard, training in Japan takes place even outside the 
work place: Japanese employees-managers  and nonmanagers alike-“social- 
ize” frequently after work in restaurants and bars, as if with family members or 
close friends. Such socializing is considered to be more important for younger 
employees than for those with long tenure in the firm.35  These activities pro- 
mote cooperative employment relations and raise productivity. Clearly, this is 
one Japanese practice that will be difficult to adapt to American workers, who 
place greater value on time spent at leisure and with families. 
The Japanese tradition of hierarchical teaching seems to have been carried 
over to modem industrial training. In Japanese firms, a large part of training in 
both technical skills and employment relations is conducted by senior workers, 
who consider it their duty to teach younger, less-experienced workers.36  In fact, 
a key criterion for promotion in a Japanese firm is one’s ability to teach cowork- 
ers. In a Japanese firm, a senior employee need not fear becoming less valuable 
to the firm should he end up training his subordinates to be more knowledge- 
able than he. On the contrary, a successful trainee is considered a credit to the 
senior employee, who in turn is judged to be all the more valuable to the firm. 
This feature is no doubt supported by  the environment of ‘‘lifetime’’ employ- 
ment, in which the newly trained worker is not a threat to the trainer’s job 
~ecunty.~’  One of the major challenges facing Japanese automobile transplants 
in the United States is training their employees to be willing to teach less- 
~  ~~ 
American ones. This implication, in turn, may bear on the more cooperative industrial relations 
that have existed in Japanese firms, in contrast to those in the United States. 
34. Koike (1990) discusses a related practice in which a worker writes reports, to be discussed 
in workshop meetings later, on troubles he has encountered on the shop floor and on how he has 
dealt with them. 
35. It is said that a typical Japanese “salary-man” returns home at about 11 :30 P.M. almost every 
night. Usually, there is no overtime pay for these activities. See Valigra (1990) for an account of  a 
typical day in the life of a Japanese worker of management rank. 
36. Koike (1990) stresses the role of hierarchical teaching in the job rotation system. According 
to this system, a veteran worker stays close to and instructs a new worker. 
37. The relationship between job security and the incentive to provide training has been recog- 
nized. Parsons (1990) reminds us that early apprenticeship contracts addressed this problem by 
restricting the apprentice’s right to compete with the master, by  specifying, for example, that the 
apprentice could not operate within a certain range of the master’s own shop. I hasten to remind 
the reader of  my argument that job security should not prevent inefficient separations from taking 
place (see section 4.5). 125  Employment-Based Training in Japanese Firms in Japan and the U.S. 
experienced fellow workers.38  This finding is ironic, since Japan learned from 
the United States-through  the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the Occupa- 
tion Authority-the  importance of training supervisory employees in job in- 
struction, during the years immediately following the end of World War I1 (Ni- 
hon Sangyo Kunren Kyokai 1971, 330-45).39 
Much has been said about team-based production in Japanese manufactur- 
ing.@  An aspect often neglected in the discussion of this subject is that it is a 
device for investing in employment relations. At the heart of productive team- 
work is the ability to share information and responsibilities. Japanese training 
emphasizes sharing information and responsibility to carry out a task. Imagine 
a situation, for example, in which a supervisor asks a subordinate worker to 
fix a glitch in the production process. A Japanese worker would see such a 
request as an opportunity to prove his value to the firm. He would take it upon 
himself to ask all conceivable parties for advice and information, and those 
asked would, in turn, be trained to provide help willingly on the spot. Should 
he fail to come up with a solution, he would not be penalized. Instead, if  he 
solves, say, eight of  ten problems, he will gain respect and his prospects of 
promotion are improved. In turn, others depend on him, when called on, to 
provide help, In contrast, an American worker is said to be reluctant to seek 
advice unless his superior specifically requests such action, and many of those 
contacted would  be  equally reluctant to  cooperate by  providing  help  and 
advice.‘“ 
A unique training device in a Japanese firm is the employee rotation system. 
This system is a “lifelong” process in which a worker is rotated among several 
assignments over many years, rather than the commonly understood practice 
whereby a worker performs different tasks on a regular basis, say  within a 
week. Through the lifelong job rotation, an employee becomes trained in both 
technical skills and employment relations. Something resembling Japanese- 
38. Many transplants judge the promotability of an employee by criteria that include the employ- 
ee’s ability to teach others. 
39. Job instruction, job methods (methods for improvement), and job relations (interpersonal 
relations) were the three components of  the “training within industry” (TWI) concept developed 
in the United States during the war years to rapidly produce a skilled work force. The TWI concept 
is synonymous with on-the-job training. The GHQ’s guidance was patterned on the U.S.  War Man- 
power Commission, which developed a comprehensive training approach based on TWI. The com- 
mission is said to have trained about 2 million supervisors during the war years. Japan also learned 
from the United States how to conduct management training, quality control, and interpersonal 
relations during these years. An important point, however, is that the GHQ provided only manuals 
and that the Japanese had to interpret them and develop their own approach (Nihon Sangyo Kunren 
Kyokai 1971). 
40. See, for example, Womack et al. (1990, chap. 5). 
41. A Japanese manager at a transplant told me of his recent experience. His American subordi- 
nate failed to complete an assignment one day. He asked the worker why he did not seek advice 
and information from Mr. X in another department. The worker gave several excuses, which could 
be summed up as “you didn’t tell me to.” A corollary of this experience, according to this manager, 
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type job rotation  does exist at Honda of America Manufacturing,  where an 
associate-a  term referring to Honda employees-will  be cycled through sev- 
eral different task areas (painting, welding, assembling, purchasing, etc.), dur- 
ing a period of several years. Other Japanese transplants are newer than Honda, 
and it is too early to tell whether they practice job rotation in the true sense. 
Job rotation  creates workers  who are trained in intrafirm  general, though 
firm-specific,  skills. As a result, the trained worker  is able to function in a 
multitudes  of  tasks  and,  in  Alfred  Marshall’s  words  cited  earlier,  to  “act 
promptly and show resource when anything goes wrong,” and “to accommo- 
date oneself quickly to changes in detail of the work done.”42  Moreover, since 
these skills are useful in many divisions within the firm, a decline in demand 
in one division is unlikely to lead to a discharge of affected workers. The re- 
sulting job security encourages the workers to invest in employment relations, 
to teach less-experienced fellow workers,  and to welcome new technologies 
without re~istance.~~  Also, most management-level employees were once ordi- 
nary employees within the same firm, have gone through the job rotation pro- 
cess, and were members of enterprise unions. As a result, these management 
personnel are more closely  attuned to the idiosyncrasies of the firm’s opera- 
tions and are able, therefore, to communicate with the employees better than 
managers who have been with the firm for only a short period of time. 
Although informal training characterizes Japan’s approach, Japanese work- 
ers do receive  periodic  formal training  as well.  These formal training  pro- 
grams, called “off-jt” programs, typically are designed to help workers acquire 
theoretical  knowledge  relating  to what  they  have  learned  through  informal 
training  (Koike 1990). In spite of the term, such training  is not always con- 
ducted outside the establishment. Larger establishments are more likely to con- 
duct it in-house as well as to offer it more frequently. Smaller firms have relied 
on courses taught at vocational training schools and other outside sources. Ac- 
cording to a government  survey, for example, in  1988 almost 74 percent of 
establishments surveyed conducted some off-jt programs. Almost 97 percent 
of establishments employing more than  1,000 workers conducted such train- 
ing, while the comparable magnitude for establishments with 30-99  employ- 
ees was 68.5 percent.44 
Table 4.1 summarizes another result of that survey. According to column 1, 
most of the respondents had received formal training in the past, though male 
42. A similar point was made by  Koike (1984) and Aoki (1988). Aoki (1988) notes that “the 
multifunctionality of  workers fostered by  a  wide range of job experience  (and job rotation in 
particular) may enable each shop to adjust job assignments flexibly in response to the requirements 
of  the downstream operation.. . , Further, workers trained in  a wide range of  skills can better 
understand why more defeqtive products are being produced and how to cope with the situation 
as well as prevent it from recurring” (36-37). 
43. Carmichael and MacLeod (1992) presents a formal model of this argument. 
44. These magnitudes are from Shokugyo Kunren Kyoku (Japan Ministry of Labor), Minkan 
Kyoiku  Kunren Jittui  Chosu Hokoku Sho  (Report  on the  Survey of  Private  Sector Training) 
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Table 4.1  Formal Training (off-jt) in Japan, 1989 
Timinga (% of  respondents who received training) 
Received  Within One  At Promotion 
Training (% of  Year of  Time or Job  Within Recent 
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Source: Shokugyo Kunren Kyoku (Japan Ministry of Labor), Minkan Kyoiku Kunren Jifui Chosu 
Hokoku Sho (Report on the Survey of  Private Sector Training) (Tokyo, 1990). table 12. 
Note: This table is based on 6,929 worker respondents. 
Respondents can be included in more than one category. 
workers are more likely than females to have received training. Many of the 
respondents evidently received formal training within the first year of employ- 
ment, while some respondents received training around the time of promotion 
and/or at the time of job rotation (see cols. 2 and 3). There is a hint that educa- 
tion and formal training are complements to each other: workers with higher 
educational levels are more likely to have received formal training (see cols. 1 
and 2). That off-jt programs are offered continually is indicated by  the fact 
that workers with higher tenure levels are more likely to have received formal 
training, as well as by the fact that the proportion receiving training within the 
most recent two years is high for all tenure groups (see cols. 1 and 4). 
It appears that formal training offered within the first year of employment 
has been increasing in Japan. According to column 2, for example, 80 percent 
of those with tenure of less than five years received formal training, while com- 
parable proportions decrease for those with successively greater years of ten- 
ure. Thus, for those with tenure of 20 years or more, the proportion is a little 
over 45 percent. Since those not receiving training are more likely to have 
separated from the firm than those receiving training, the trend implicit in this 
column may be an underestimate of the true trend. 
Table 4.2 reports on per-employee expenses for three industrial sectors. The 
magnitudes are relative to direct labor expense-the  sum of wages and sala- 128  Masanori Hashimoto 
Table 4.2  Per-Employee Labor Expenses per Direct Labor Expenses: Japan, 
1988 (%) 
Firm Size (number of 








































































































Source: Rod0 Horei Kyokai (Association of Labor Laws and Ordinances), Rod0  Jikan Seido To Rod0 
Hiyo No  Jittai (Hours of Work System and the Status of Labor Expenses) (Tokyo, 1989). table 39. 
Notes: Direct labor expenses are wages and salaries, bonus payments, and other cash payments. Indi- 
rect labor expenses include payments in kind, retirement contributions, legally specified insurance 
premiums and other payments, training expenses, hiring expenses, expenses for providing uniforms, 
and others. Training expenses are expenses incurred in running training facilities, payments to instruc- 
tors, honorariums, etc. Hiring expenses are expenses incurred in advertising openings, administering 
tests, as well as personnel expenses involved in screening and hiring. 
ries, bonuses, and other cash payments. Indirect expenses per employee clearly 
are higher in larger establishments. Training expenses refer only to expenses 
associated with formal training; even then, they do not include such items as 
capital costs or maintenance costs of training facilities and travel costs of staff 
attending courses (Dore and Sako  1989, 81). However, if  one is willing to 
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ing costs-both  formal and informal-this  table becomes suggestive of  the 
pattern of training costs in~urred.4~  On that assumption, total training expenses 
per  employee  tend  to  be  higher  in  larger  establishments. Total  training 
expenses are likely to be higher than hiring costs, especially since training 
expenses are much more likely to be understated than are hiring expenses.46 
In summary, Japanese firms face a favorable environment for training. Tech- 
nical training is facilitated by the little heterogeneity in, and the high level of, 
the basic skills that new employees bring from schools. Recruitment of  new 
graduates relies heavily on the recommendations of  selected schools in order 
to homogenize the work force in terms of basic skills, attitude toward working 
and learning, and personality. Such Japanese practices as team-based produc- 
tion, training of young workers by experienced employees, and training by job 
rotation expedite the diffusion of knowledge, skills, and information within a 
Japanese firm. These practices, a reflection of what the theory in section 4.2 
referred to as investment in information reliability, result in compliant and pro- 
ductive work forces in Japanese firms. 
4.4  Japanese Automobile Transplants 
Let us turn now to adaptations of the Japanese training approach in some 
automobile transplants. It was noted earlier that employees’ homogeneity in 
basic knowledge, willingness to learn new skills and to teach others, and ability 
to function as team members lowers the cost of their training. Creating a homo- 
geneous work force has been perhaps the most challenging and costly task 
facing the transplants. They  are faced with  more hiring constraints in  the 
United States than in Japan. Unlike in Japan, for example, employers cannot 
consider age, race, sex, or marital status in their hiring decisions. As a result, 
a plant’s work force is bound to be more heterogeneous in the United States 
than in Japan. 
To cope with the great heterogeneity of the American labor force, Japanese 
automobile transplants had first to invest many resources in creating the right 
environment with a brand new work force for a few thousand employees and 
to build their “corporate cultures” and common  language^.^' In Japan, as dis- 
45.  This assumption is plausible, since in Japan, off-jt is a complement to informal training: as 
discussed earlier, formal training is designed to offer systematic and theoretical knowledge relat- 
ing to what workers experience on the shop floor. 
46.  Although this table refers to 1988, tabulations for other years indicate similar patterns. 
47.  In other words, the environment box in fig. 4.1 was made endogenous, to some extent. The 
heterogeneity consideration appears to have played a role in location decisions. For example, the 
decision by many of the transplants to locate in rural midwestern areas is said to have been influ- 
enced by the availability of a German-American work force with a strong work ethic (Gelsanliter 
1990). It is worth recalling that Honda of America Manufacturing was sued for having given hiring 
preference to workers from the Marysville, Ohio, area to the exclusion of the more racially mixed 
labor pool available in nearby Columbus. The firm  settled out of court in 1988 and paid $6 million 
to about 370  black and female workers. Since then, according to one of its managers, Honda has 
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cussed earlier, employers can rely on schools to perform much of the screen- 
ing. In the United States, however, the transplants had to recruit workers, with- 
out the aid of schools. Many of them hired consultants to develop screening 
 procedure^.^^ 
Perhaps because high school graduates are less likely to quit or be absent 
from the job (Weiss 1988) and are more likely to succeed in entry-level basic 
training (Lynch 1989, 1992), most transplants prefer production workers to 
have  a high school diploma or the eq~ivalent.4~  They prefer young workers 
with nonautomotive experience, at least for production workers, because of 
their desire to train, rather than retrain, workers in  their own ways  of  op- 
erati~~g.~~  The common objective was summarized by  one of  the transplant 
managers: Give us stable and dependable people with good hearts, and we can 
make anything of them. This objective contrasts with that of a typical Ameri- 
can employer whose hiring decision hinges on applicants’ experience, skills, 
and accomplishments: Can they weld? 
Production-level employees were given batteries of tests, including the Gen- 
eral Aptitude Test Battery (GATB), and tests to gauge their ability to assemble 
and disassemble simple mechanisms and to perform such tasks cooperatively 
with others. Typically, an applicant had to go through a multiphased assess- 
ment procedure (see App. B for Toyota’s hiring procedure). At Subaru-Isuzu 
Automotive (SIA), the assessment process took more than 25  Only 
about 12 out of every 100 applicants were successful and were hired through 
this procedure, which included initial screening and the administration of the 
GATB tests, interviews, problem-solving and group discussion exercises, as- 
before selecting new hires. See Higuchi (1987) and Shimada (1988) for related discussions on 
Japanese transplants, and see Business Week (October 3, 1989) for a description of screening prac- 
tices at Mazda Motor Manufacturing and Diamond-Star Motors. 
48. These consultants themselves went to Japan to observe Japanese practices before developing 
their recommendations for screening procedures. 
49. Some transplants do not explicitly require a high school diploma, however. Lynch (1989) 
found that, in  the US.  National Longitudinal Survey of  Youth, having a high school diploma 
raises the probability of receiving apprenticeship training or off-the-job training, e.g.,  being sent 
to business college, barber or beauty school, or a nursing program. However, she found little evi- 
dence of complementarity between schooling and on-the-job training. 
50. Many skilled workers-machine  maintenance  workers, die handlers, or welders, for ex- 
ample-came  from small manufacturing shops and, occasionally, from automobile-related indus- 
tries. Many of the management-level employees also have nonautomotive manufacturing experi- 
ence. Typically, only 5-8  percent of all employees have previous automotive experience, and the 
average age of the work force hovers around 35. It is reported that the transplants chose the rural 
Midwest because of its ethnic homogeneity-German  Americans, for example-and  because that 
they wanted to avoid hiring workers with union backgrounds (see, e.g., Fucini and Fucini  1990; 
Gelsanliter 1990; Shook 1988). Those I interviewed stressed the midwestern work ethic and dili- 
gence as the most important reasons for their location decision. 
5 1. See Woroniecki and Wellins (1  990) for a compact but informative discussion of SIA’s  hir- 
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sembly exercises, and reference  Successful applicants were then 
placed on 90-day probationary appointments with pay, during which they were 
observed and trained on the job. The attrition rate during the probationary pe- 
riod was about 3 percent. Since then, SIA has experienced an absenteeism rate 
of only 3 percent. 
High on the agenda of all transplants was an employee’s ability to work in a 
team. Individualistic applicants were turned down. At Mazda Motor Manufac- 
turing, for example, ten to fifteen applicants were put in the same room to be 
tested on their ability to follow directions from worksheets and to help fellow 
workers who fell behind.53  Very  few production-level workers were sent to 
Japan for training, but low-level managers-team  leaders, for example-hired 
after intensive interviewing, were sent to Japan. There, they received training 
in company philosophy, management style, and technical skills. 
In addition to building a homogeneous work force, the transplants shared 
another experience: newly hired employees had to be trained from scratch in 
such elementary skills as how to tighten bolts, how to assemble a simple mech- 
anism, and so forth. A Japanese manager at a transplant stated, “In Japan, it is 
not necessary to begin with the basic skills, but here there is no guarantee that 
the new employees have good basic skills.’’ Toyota and Nissan, for example, 
were faced with a work force which had especially low and varied technical 
~apabilities.~~  These transplants worked with the state and community colleges 
to administer preemployment training in the general basic skills, without pay 
or guarantee of employment for the students. Most of the trainees ended up in 
the hiring pool, though not all were hired immediately. Training also took place 
before hiring at Diamond-Star Motors and SIA, but their trainees were paid 
during the training period. 
For technical training, some of the transplants used elaborate formal training 
at the outset: at Toyota, maintenance associates received about 2,000 hours of 
classroom  and  laboratory  training  before  production  started.  Others,  like 
Honda, initially had no formal training programs for technical skills. Instead, 
Honda  concentrated on  teaching technical  skills on  the job,  on  instilling 
the “Honda spirit” and on teaching team building and communication skills. 
As  Honda grew,  it started to formalize the training procedure, but this was 
done by Honda’s American employees. 
In addition to initial assimilation training of new employees and subsequent 
52. This procedure was developed by  an American consulting firm  together with the parent 
companies of SIA. The staff from the consulting company was sent to Japan to observe the parent 
companies. More than 50 state government and SIA associates spent four days receiving training 
on how to make accurate selection decisions. The State of Indiana assisted SIA by screening and 
administering the GATB tests; it also provided physical facilities and staff to conduct subsequent 
assessment exercises. 
53. Shimada (1988) contains similar accounts regarding Honda’s hiring practices. 
54. Nissan declined to be interviewed. My information on Nissan is based on my interviews at 
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on-the-job training, both Honda and Toyota transplants offer a variety of for- 
mal training courses for individual development. These courses are offered at 
training centers, located adjacent to the main plant. There, numerous training 
courses are offered in basic and advanced technical skills, much like formal 
training courses in Japan. An important point to note is that these transplants’ 
formal training also includes training in employment relations, a practice that 
differs from that in Japan, where such training is conducted informally. At 
Honda of American Manufacturing (HAM), for example, general training and 
training in voluntary involvement together account for the majority of  total 
training hours (see table 4.3). 
Toyota originated lean production  and other manufacturing practices that 
are responsible for the success of Japanese products in international markets. 
Equally  significant is the seriousness with which Toyota has  conducted its 
training, as exemplified by the celebrated Toyota Kogyo Koto Gakuen (Toyota 
Industrial High School), which is has operated since the early 1950~.~~  True to 
this tradition, Toyota’s plant in Georgetown, Kentucky, offers many training 
courses, ranging in length from one week in a quality circle to 240 hours in a 
basic machining course, designed for those with little or no previous formal 
machine-shop  experien~e.~~  Nontechnical  courses are designed for all team 
members, and skilled workers receive preference over others in admission to 
technical courses. Advanced skilled-trade courses-in  machine structure (80 
hours), hydraulics (80 hours), electrical equipment control (80 hours), etc.- 
are also offered to create multiskilled  maintenance workers. Enrollment  in 
these classes is voluntary. For promotion courses, designed to prepare team 
members to become team leaders and group leaders, 800 out of  1,000 team 
members volunteered initially-50  dropped out later-but  nowadays enroll- 
ment is restricted to about 300 per year. Toyota’s promotion pool consists of 
those who have completed these courses. 
At HAM, the oldest of the Japanese transplants, training courses are classi- 
fied into general training, fundamental training, voluntary involvement train- 
ing, technical training, and the recently introduced technical development pro- 
gram  modules. Table 4.3 describes Honda’s training programs. Courses range 
in length from 4 hours (torch training) to 40 hours (maintenance). Enrollment 
is voluntary. 
It should be emphasized that these courses are meant to complement infor- 
mal on-the-job training. Also, not all of  the training content and procedures 
55. Training at the high school includes both on-the-job training and formal courses. Graduates 
from the school receive the equivalent of a high school diploma. For a useful discussion of Toyota’s 
high school, see Sumiya and Hiroshi (1978,220-28). 
56. Toyota claims to be working toward a training pace which would allow team members to 
complete their required core courses by mid-1993. This pace translates roughly to a training rate 
of 50 hours per year for team leaders and above, or 2.5 percent of work hours each year. See 
Toyota’s TMM Training and Development Catalog (Georgetown, Ky., January-December  1990). 
A Toyota spokesman reported that between January and June  1991, 569 employees completed 
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Table 4.3  Formal 'Ikaining at HAM, 1990 
5Pe  Number of Classes  Number of Associates  Total Training Hours 
Employment relations training 
General  440 
Fundamental'  30 
Voluntary involvement (VIP)  125 
Technical  355 
Technical development program modulesb 
Technical training 
5,175  75,000 
108  3,553 
1,013  8,104 
3,193  25,000 
(Introduced in 1991) 
Source: HAM, communication to author. 
Notes: In  1990, there were about  10,OOO  production associates at HAM. General training develops 
leadership and communication skills, management techniques, problem-solving and decision-making 
skills, and skills for writing performance appraisals and conducting interviews. Fundamental training 
develops technical and managerial skills. VIP training teaches a worker how to conduct quality circles, 
suggestion systems, and safety and quality award systems. (For training in quality control circles, a 
day is devoted to "QC" tools-i.e.,  charts and statistical analyses-and  result assessment, and another 
day to advanced problem solving and quality circle training.) Technical training complements an asso- 
ciate's on-the-job training with such basic skills as welding, hydraulics, and electrical and mechanical 
work. HAM estimates that 10-15  percent of its associates are uninterested in ever taking any of the 
formal training courses; in other words, they are just there to earn their paychecks. 
aFundamental  training is provided to team leaders. The rest of the training programs are for production 
associates. Ninety-nine percent of the instruction is done by experienced Honda associates. All train- 
ees are paid wages during training; if they take courses during their off hours, they are paid overtime. 
This  new training program, developed at HAM, is more specialized and advanced than existing tech- 
nical training and has 2,000 technical modules, each lasting between one hour and five days. These 
modules include aluminum machining, assembly, paint, welding, stamping, plastics, casting, and other 
process-oriented training. Trainees will progress through the modules at their own pace. HAM claims 
that the purpose of these modules is to create world-class engineers out of its associates. 
were imported from the parent companies in Japan. Instead, each transplant 
developed its own methods.57  For example, the Japanese emphasis on  self- 
study is not practical with the American work force, so it is not used at these 
transplants. Toyota's  course on conflict resolution is nonexistent at Toyota in 
Japan. Also, Japanese manuals are said to be purposely vague and suggestive 
rather than detailed and literal, giving scope for thoughts, imaging, and indi- 
vidual comprehension. American trainees prefer seeing: Show me, give me the 
picture. As a result, training at the transplants makes extensive use of videos 
and pictures, rather than  written  materials, combined with a great deal of 
hands-on training. 
4.5  Concluding Remarks 
New employees in Japan receive lifelong training not only in technical skills 
but also in skills needed to function as team members-sharing  information 
57. In fact, formal training programs have been rare in Japan. As will be discussed in the next 
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and responsibilities  among colleagues and teaching other, less-experienced 
workers. Although much training takes place informally, Japanese workers re- 
ceive periodic courses of formal training (off-jt) to gain theoretical knowledge. 
Larger establishments are more likely to offer off-jt programs and are more 
likely to conduct them within the firm. Smaller firms have relied on courses 
taught at vocational training schools and other outside sources. In Japanese 
transplants, formal training includes training in employment relations, as well 
as technical training (see table 4.3). 
Close coordination  between  schools and employers in Japan facilitates  a 
consistent flow of new, malleable employees to firms. This way, the Japanese 
educational system ensures the supply of educated and trainable new workers 
to all industries, leaving the provision of industrial training to the individual 
firms. The relative homogeneity in, and high levels of, mastery of academic 
subjects of new employees in Japan lowers the costs of investing in both techni- 
cal skills and employment relations. As a result, the Japanese work force has 
become both cooperative and productive. The Japanese approach developed 
after World War 11, by combining lessons from the United States with elements 
from Japan’s own traditions and culture, and was consolidated and perfected 
against the background of rapid economic growth starting in the late 1950s. 
Clearly, employers in Japan and the United States face different constraints 
in hiring and training. It appears, for example, that American workers’ high 
propensity to move and management’s failure to build trust-based employment 
relations have made it difficult to implement Japanese-style long-term training 
in many U.S. firms. An executive at a Japanese transplant noted the short-term 
outlook of a typical American worker, “If an American worker is praised, he 
will ask for a bonus or pay raise right away.” Also, creating a homogeneous 
work force in the United States is a costly undertaking, as evidenced by the 
elaborate hiring procedures used by the transplants. The diversity in the U.S. 
work force has had its benefits-for  example, in encouraging individual cre- 
ativity and independent thinking. Nevertheless, by raising the cost of training 
investments, diversity must be a factor in discouraging investment in employ- 
ment relationships. This consideration may explain why there has been greater 
focus on technical training than on employment relations in the United States. 
Training programs at several major U.S. firms, summarized by Lynch (1989), 
for example, are mostly directed at enhancing technical skills. 
Japanese automobile transplants in the United States are still young, but it 
is possible to compare their training approaches with the approaches of their 
parent companies. In the complete absence of Japanese-style relationships be- 
tween schools and industries, the transplants had to invest substantially in ini- 
tial hiring. Such large initial investments are not necessary for employers in 
Japan. Because of the diversity in, and the low level of, the basic academic and 
technical skills of their new hires, these transplants must offer technical train- 
ing that is much more circumscribed, and that involves more teaching of ele- 
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the practices  of  Honda and Toyota, transplant  employees receive extensive 
training in team building, communication  skills, and other skills in employ- 
ment relations (table 4.3). 
Many transplant managers are American, and their proportion is likely to 
grow. In most cases, American managers at transplants report to Japanese su- 
periors. At the same time, given the relative flatness of organizations and the 
prevalence of consensus-based decision making in the transplants, they have 
less power than typical plant managers in traditional U.S.-owned plants. Thus, 
some transplant managers may feel squeezed from above and below. In my 
interviews, I found many American managers were enthusiastic with their jobs 
and predicted that they would still be with the transplants in five years. But 
some were not so sure. Indeed, some managers quit working for transplants 
after only a few years, to take up positions in U.S.-owned manufacturing plants 
(Fucini and  Fucini  1990). Through  such  selection  processes  and  training, 
transplants are likely to end up with a kind of manager different from the tradi- 
tional automobile plant manager. 
In talking to both Japanese and American managers, I discovered that Amer- 
ican managers’ understanding of Japanese practices is still developing, Japa- 
nese and American managers both discussed in equal depth the role of inde- 
pendent study in Japanese training, the just-in-time inventory (kanban)  system, 
and the kaizen practice.58  However, when discussing team-based production, 
sharing of information and responsibility, and job rotation, American managers 
tended to focus on technical aspects. Few of them mentioned the nuances of 
these practices that Japanese managers talked about. For example, American 
managers tended to give a mechanical description of team-based activities- 
team size and team function, for example-without  stressing the point that if 
a team member encounters difficulties, all relevant members within his or her 
team,  and  even  members  of  other  teams,  willingly  share the  information 
needed to solve the problem. Job rotation is another example. American man- 
agers talked about rotating workers within teams every two hours, for example, 
without noting the more important aspect-lifelong  learning through job ro- 
tation. 
The principal components of Japanese training that have been instrumental 
in shaping Japan’s highly productive labor force are reliance on self-study for 
technical training, training of junior workers by senior workers, sharing of in- 
formation and responsibilities, lifelong training by job rotation, and occasional 
infusion of formal training throughout an employee’s tenure. Can these prac- 
tices be sustained with the American labor force? The experiences of the Japa- 
nese transplants do suggest that some of these practices will be adapted. The 
answer depends in part on how well American workers, and especially manag- 
ers, learn what these Japanese practices are really about. 
58. The term kaizen refers to making small incremental improvements continuously rather than 
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Popular discussions suggest that the answer also hinges on employers’ abili- 
ties to credibly foster job security and on employee commitment to long-term 
career development within firms. Without doubt, job security in Japan helped 
promote lifelong training by job rotation, teaching of junior workers by senior 
workers, and sharing of information. But what do job security and long-term 
career development mean, and how can they be developed? According to my 
theory, job security and long-term commitment are not synonymous with “life- 
time’’ employment adhered to regardless of changing conditions. Rather, they 
refer to an arrangement in which inefficient separations are reduced to a mini- 
mum but efficient separations take place without fail. 
It may be tempting to blame the employment-at-will doctrine, which gives 
employers and employees the right to separate unilaterally, as being respon- 
sible for the apparent lack of job security in U.S. labor markets. It should be 
remembered that this doctrine underpins Japanese labor markets as well, the 
celebrated lifetime  employment  notwithstanding,  According  to  my  theory, 
employment-at-will  guarantees that  separation, if it is efficient, will always 
take place. Since this doctrine is an inherent feature of the American labor 
market, the important task becomes one of  reducing inefficient separations. 
Investment in employment relations such as the peer review systems at Honda 
and Toyota is a concrete example of an institutional framework that reduces 
inefficient separations. 
Finally, to promote understanding of  training issues, future efforts at data 
collection should address the distinction between technical training and train- 
ing in employment relations. In particular, to ignore employment relations is 
to miss an increasingly important component of  training, as more and more 
Western employers adopt elements of the Japanese operating style and philoso- 
phy. In Japan, the fact that most training occurs informally makes comprehen- 
sive data collection difficult. Fortunately, in the United States training tends to 
be formalized, as is evident even with the Japanese transplants, so data collec- 
tion may be less difficult here than in Japan. 
Appendix A 
ProJiles of Selected Japanese Automobile 
Manufacturers 
The following are brief profiles of the automobile manufacturers I visited and 
are based on information I gathered by interviewing management personnel 
and on published sources. Conspicuously  missing is Nissan, which rejected 
my repeated requests for a visit. Some common features of the Japanese auto- 
mobile transplants are: 
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from Japan  are assembled  into automobiles.  On the contrary, all contain  a 
stamping shop, a plastic molding shop, a body shop, a paint shop, and a trim- 
and-final-assembly area. 
2. The transplants constantly remind employees that the company is made 
of its people-employees  of all ranks are referred to as either associates or 
team members and wear uniforms, which are required in some plants and “en- 
couraged‘’ in others. Employees of all ranks eat in the same cafeteria and park 
their cars in the same parking lots. All transplants have an open-floor layout 
for offices, though some have low partitions. 
3. Production tasks at the transplants are performed in teams. A typical team 
consists of  seven to ten team members and is responsible  for a part of the 
manufacturing process. A typical transplant has over 150 teams on a typical 
day. Team leaders are selected during the assessment process, and many of 
them have been  sent to Japan for brief training. Team leaders are paid 5-8 
percent more than ordinary team members. Typically, a group of several teams 
is supervised by a group leader. 
4. Much emphasis is placed on the importance of working as a team, nurtur- 
ing trust through open communication, building quality into the product, and 
striving for constant improvement (kaizen).  As noted earlier, the term kaizen 
refers to introducing small incremental improvements continuously rather than 
making occasional large improvements. All the transplants have various types 
of employee participation programs including quality control circles, sugges- 
tion systems, and improvement programs. 
5. All the transplants use the just-in-time inventory (kanban)  system. Since, 
in the United States, parts suppliers are located farther away from the main 
plants than in Japan, the level of  parts inventories is higher here. Honda of 
America Manufacturing, for example, typically has a one-day supply’  of parts, 
but its Japanese parent has only a few-hour supply. Toyota Motor Manufactur- 
ing, U.S.A., carries a 30-day inventory of steel, but seats are manufactured and 
delivered by  a nearby  supplier  in the morning for installation  in early af- 
ternoon. 
6. Management consists of some Americans and some Japanese (except at 
Nissan, whose management is 100 percent American). Workers on the shop 
floor are almost all American, with Japanese workers serving only as advisors, 
sometimes called “facilitators.” Unlike in Japan, female workers are well repre- 
sented on assembly lines. 
7. All transplants stress the importance of job security, though none “guaran- 
tees” that there will be no layoffs. 
8. Production-level employees are paid hourly wages. (Their counterparts in 
Japan are on salaries.) These employees start with wages that are lower than 
those of their counterparts at the Big Three, but when the attendance bonus 
and other payments are included, their wages compare well to those at the Big 
Three. In all transplants studied, wages increase in a series of steps. Honda of 
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compensation schemes, perhaps because it has been in operation the longest 
among all Midwest automobile transplants. The starting base hourly wage was 
$12.00 in October 1993 and would increase in six steps until it reached $15.90 
in 18 months. In addition, pay could be augmented by an attendance bonus and 
profit sharing. Profit sharing at HAM is based on Honda’s profits worldwide 
rather than on American operations alone. In  1993, an associate with three 
years’ tenure and perfect attendance would earn a total hourly wage of $17.78 
(a $16.20 base wage, a $1.00 attendance bonus, and $0.58 bonus sharing), 
according to HAM’S brochure Wages  and Bene$ts  (Appendix C). In addition to 
wages and bonuses, HAM employees receive various insurance and assistance 
benefits, including shares of stock in Honda Motor Co. through a stock pur- 
chase program, and educational assistance. Such newer transplants as Subaru- 
Isuzu Automotive and Diamond-Star Motors were still planning to introduce 
elaborate compensation programs as of summer 1990. 
9. With the exception of Mazda, all transplants are located in rural areas, 
and their work forces are young and have little previous automotive experience. 
10. Except for Diamond-Star  and Mazda, the work forces at these trans- 
plants are not unionized. Diamond-Star and Mazda are both organized by the 
UAW, but are not covered by national agreements like the one applying to the 
Big Three. Their agreements contain more flexibility in job assignment, fewer 
job demarcations, and fewer worker categories than a typical UAW contract. 
Both have no-strike contracts. 
Diamond-Star Motors (DSM): Normal, Illinois 
Diamond-Star Motors started production of Plymouth Laser and Mitsubishi 
Eclipse models in June 1988 as a fifty-fifty joint venture between Mitsubishi 
Motors and Chrysler. This plant is said to be the world’s most technologically 
advanced, with more than 470 robots in operation (Business Week, August 14, 
1989). It consists of a 2,000,000-square-foot building and a 1.5-mile oval test 
track. At full capacity, the plant can produce 240,000 vehicles per year. In 
October 1991, Mitsubishi acquired full ownership in DSM by buying Chrysl- 
er’s 50 percent share (Wall Street Journal, October 30, 1991). 
As of August 1990, there were about 3,000 employees, called associates, of 
whom 21 percent were female. Minorities constituted 11 percent. There also 
were about 60 Japanese employees, of whom 25 were management level. The 
section chief is Japanese, but direct supervision is done by an American. About 
35 percent of the work force has manufacturing experience, but only 5 percent 
has automotive experience. Before joining DSM, many members of the work 
force were farmers or employees at fast-food restaurants or at small manufac- 
turing establishments.  Turnover has been  about 4 percent. Most discharges 
have been because of absenteeism. About a third of  those quitting were re- 
called by Caterpillar, found new jobs, or were tied movers with their spouses. 
The plant has been organized by the UAW  since its inception. The union 139  Employment-Based Training in Japanese Firms in Japan and the U.S. 
and DSM hold periodic meetings at the company level and section level within 
the bargaining unit to share information regarding the operations. 
Honda of America Manufacturing (HAM), Inc.: Marysville, Ohio 
This operation is the oldest, and therefore the most experienced and most 
informative, of all the Japanese automobile transplants in the United States. It 
started its U.S.  production of motorcycles in September 1979. The production 
of the Honda Accord began in November 1982, at its new  1,000,000-square- 
foot plant built next to the motorcycle plant. In 1986, the automobile plant was 
expanded to 3,100,000 square feet, with production capacity reaching 360,000 
cars per year. Subsequently, the Anna Engine Plant (Anna, Ohio) was added in 
1987, and the East Liberty Plant (East Liberty, Ohio) started production near 
the Transportation Research Center (1989), which HAM bought from the state 
of  Ohio, making total production capacity more than 500,000 cars per year. 
With the Anna Engine Plant producing engines and drive trains, the domestic 
content of Ohio-produced Hondas is said to reach over 70 percent. The Accord 
coupe and station wagon were designed in the United States and produced 
exclusively at HAM’s plant in Ohio. Honda of  America Manufacturing now 
exports to Canada, Israel, South Korea, Mexico, and Taiwan, as well as to 
Japan. 
As of November 1990, HAM had 5,200 employees, called associates, at the 
Marysville Plant, of whom 33 percent were female and a little over 10 percent 
were minority. The Anna Engine Plant had about 1,500 associates, and the 
East Liberty Plant had about 1,800. Many of these employees came from such 
occupations as hairdresser, grocery clerk, high school teacher, and farmer. The 
number with previous automotive experience is very  small. Honda’s produc- 
tion associates are said to have earned about $40,000 in 1989 including over- 
time, which is no doubt more than what most of them had earned previously. 
Appendix C contains information on HAM’s wages and benefits. 
The Associated Development Center adjacent to the main plant contains 
seven classrooms (20-person capacity per room), a computer room, a graphics 
room, an auditorium (198-person capacity), Honda Hall (300:person  capac- 
ity), laboratories, and a technical information room. Training classes are given 
in  such technical subjects as welding, hydraulics, and robotics, as well as in 
the Japanese and English languages and stress management. The center runs 
Honda’s Voluntary Improvement Programs, which include a suggestions sys- 
tem, quality control programs, and quality and safety award programs. In Sep- 
tember 1990, there were over 350 such activities in progress. Under the award 
programs, an associate is given points for making useful suggestions, contrib- 
uting to quality improvements, or spotting defects. The computer tabulates 
points, and the results are posted for  everyone to see. The grand prize is a 
Honda Civic, six of which had been given away to winners as of August 1990. 
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Honda’s practices came up in a few of my interviews with employees of other 
transplants. 
One of the unique features of HAM is the Associate Review Panel system, 
by which a discharged employee can appeal the discharge decision. The panel’s 
primary function is to decide whether the discharge decision was made prop- 
erly, rather than to serve as a grievance committee. Unlike the usual case, the 
panel becomes operational after an employee is discharged. A discharged em- 
ployee may request a panel review within three days of discharge. The names 
of six nonsupervisory panelists are then chosen randomly from a tumbler. At 
the hearing, a mediator, the discharged associate, an Associate Relations pre- 
senter, and one senior manager are present, in addition to the six voting panel- 
ists. The discharged employee represents himself or herself, and the hearing 
consists only of  questions and answers-no  statements can be made. At the 
end of the hearing, only the six panelists remain in the room, and the decision 
is made by secret vote. So far, there have been 18  to 20 review panels per year, 
involving about 30 percent of terminated employees. About 20 percent of those 
who asked for a review have been reemployed. This system was implemented 
in 1985 at HAM; no similar system exists at Honda’s Japanese plants. 
Honda Motors-Suzuka  Plant: Suzuka, Japan 
This is one of Honda’s five plants in Japan. It was built as Honda’s third 
full-scale plant in 1960, to manufacture motorcycles and automobiles. As of 
February 1990, this plant employed 10,967 associates. Line 3 at this plant has 
the latest technology and served as the prototype for the East Liberty Plant in 
Ohio. On the day I visited, I saw no female workers on the assembly line, 
and the male workers looked very young (under 25 years of age). Unlike their 
counterparts in the United States, all associates are salaried employees. The 
majority of the associates have a high school or junior college background. 
There is a training center in a separate building, but it consisted only of 
meeting rooms and halls. There was no evidence of specialized training as in 
the Associated Development Center at HAM. Very  few people were in  the 
center. Overall, it struck me as rather stark in comparison to its counterpart at 
HAM. Perhaps this atmosphere reflects the tendency for Japanese training to 
take place on the job in combination with independent study, rather than in 
classrooms. There also is a voluntary improvement program, much like the one 
at HAM. 
Mazda Motor Manufacturing, USA, Corp.: Flat Rock, Michigan 
This plant, occupying 2,700,000 square feet, is 25 percent owned by Ford. 
It started production of a Mazda model in September 1987 and a Ford model 
in January 1988. At full capacity, it can produce 240,000 cars per year. A col- 
lective agreement was signed with the UAW  in March  1988. Mazda won a 
long-term  commitment from the UAW  to  the principles  of  flexibility, effi- 
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ones used by Mazda in Japan (Fucini and Fucini 1990, 170). Mazda, in turn, 
promised the UAW  to not lay off employees, except for financial exigencies, 
and to provide meaningful employee involvement programs. 
Employees at Mazda are called team members. In September 1990, there 
were 500 nonunion Americans, 2,850 unionized Americans, and 150 Japanese 
team members. Japanese workers mostly serve as advisors, since they cannot 
work on the assembly line, according to the agreement with the UAW. Almost 
30 percent of  all workers are female, and minorities constituted a little less 
than 19 percent. 
Mazda has kept a Support Member Pool, a pool of original applicants who 
were not hired initially as regular employees. Pool members are hired tempo- 
rarily to meet increased labor demand. They receive the same wage rate as 
regular team members, but much less in benefits, and they do not receive credit 
toward seniority. According to the agreement with the UAW, should Mazda use 
the same pool member for more than three months, it must hire that person as 
a regular team member. In September 1990, there were about 300 members in 
the pool, and Mazda was using them at the rate of 50 or fewer at a time. Mazda 
had hired about 75 pool members as regular team members. 
Subaru-Isuzu Automotive (SIA), Inc.: Lafayette, Indiana 
This joint-venture plant (51 percent Fuji Heavy Industries, 49 percent Isuzu 
Motors) started production in September 1989. The plant occupies 2,300,000 
square feet, with the capacity to produce 12,000 cars per month. It produces 
Subaru passenger cars and Isuzu light trucks and sports utility vehicles. 
As of July 1990, SIA had 1,727 American associates, 125 regular employees 
from Japan, and another group of 108 or so helpers from Japan. The work force 
was about 24 percent female and about 5 percent black. Only a small propor- 
tion of the work force (about 8 percent) has previous automotive experience. 
As of July 1990, about 20 people had quit to return to their former jobs or for 
other personal reasons, and 5 people had been dismissed for absenteeism or 
falsification of  applications. The mean age of  the work force was  about 34 
years. At SIA only about 65 percent of assembly work is performed by robots 
in order to promote employment creation in Indiana, by agreement with the 
state. 
Toyota Motor Manufacturing (TMM), U.S.A., Inc.: Georgetown, 
Kentucky 
Production of  Camrys began  in July  1988 at this plant, which occupies 
4,450,000 square feet. It is said that this plant is a clone of its parent plant in 
Japan, and it has relatively few robots (Business Week, August 14, 1989). In 
late 1990, TMM announced its plan to add another plant nearby, with the ca- 
pacity to produce 200,000 Camrys per year (Business Week, December 10, 
1990). It exports Camrys to Taiwan and Japan. Toyota’s training center takes 
up 48,000 square feet and contains some ten classrooms and a “high bay” area. 142  Masanori Hashimoto 
As of  early  1990, the plant employed  3,123 team  members, of  whom 25 
percent were female and a little less than 13  percent were minorities. The plant 
had experienced a turnover rate of about 5 percent. Most were hired from Ken- 
tucky  and  had  little automotive  experience.  The Team Member Handbook 
(February 1988, 102-103)  states that lifetime employment is Toyota’s goal, but 
that the “employment-at-will’’ arrangement governs all employment relations. 
Toyota has had an elaborate system for reviewing discharge cases since late 
1987. The review is camed out by  the Peer Investigation Committee. Unlike 
Honda’s Associate Review  Panel, Toyota’s  process takes place prior to dis- 
charge. The committee consists of six team members with voting rights and 
is chaired by  the  nonvoting Employee  Relations Manager. The selection of 
committee membership is by length of service at TMM. When an employee’s 
behavior and performance warrant possible termination, the Employee Rela- 
tions Manager reviews the facts in the case. Should he or she decide that termi- 
nation is called for, the employee in question is notified of the pending action 
by his or her team leader. The employee then is sent home until the committee 
meeting is arranged. He or she receives pay for the time away from work unless 
he or she is later terminated. The employee in question has the opportunity to 
make a statement to the committee. The committee’s recommendation is based 
on a secret ballot.  Regardless of  the committee’s recommendation,  the final 
decision is up to the general manager of human resources and the general man- 
ager of the employee’s particular area. As of  June 1991, 30  employees have 
gone through this process, of whom 14 were reinstated. Toyota’s peer review 
system did not come from Japan. Rather, it was patterned after similar systems 
used in U.S. companies. 
Appendix B 
Hiring Practices at Toyota Motor Manufacturing 
(TMM), U.S.A.,  Inc. 
The following information was summarized from a mimeographed document 
from Toyota Motor Manufacturing, U.S.A., Inc. 
Since 1985, the year Toyota Motor Manufacturing decided to built a plant 
in Kentucky, the goal of the company has been to produce cars of the highest 
quality within the United States. To succeed in this endeavor, Toyota commit- 
ted  itself  to assemble a work force of  superior quality. It developed hiring 
guidelines that enable each candidate to demonstrate skills in every area that 
the company deems relevant. 
Hiring in the Kentucky plant was completed in three phases. The first shift 
was in place in December 1988, the second shift in May 1989, and full opera- 
tion started in 1991 with a total work force of 3,500 people and a payroll ex- 
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Toyota chooses its group or team leaders from within the company. Team 
members, however, are hired from the outside following very specific guide- 
lines. The following describes the goals of  the hiring process as well as the 
process itself. 
There are five main goals in this process, the most important one being to 
select the best candidates. The “best candidates” are defined as those with high 
potential, desire, and ability to learn and good interpersonal skills. A second 
goal is to obtain a commitment of residence from the applicant. A third goal 
is that the hiring process be fair, giving all candidates ample opportunities to 
prove their skills in relevant areas. The fourth goal is that the process be effi- 
cient, since there is a very large number of inquiries about these jobs; the Ken- 
tucky Department of Employment Services alone listed over 200,000 such in- 
quiries. Finally, the process must be made convenient to applicants. Therefore, 
the hiring process takes place all over Kentucky at the 27 offices of the Ken- 
tucky Department of Employment Services. 
The hiring process itself is conducted in six parts, enabling Toyota to acquire 
and evaluate all relevant information about the candidates. 
First, two interviews take place at the Kentucky Department of Employment 
Services. The first one lasts an hour and is used to describe the job and obtain 
information regarding the applicant’s work experience and skills. Typically, the 
applicant fills out an application and is shown a video explaining the hiring 
process and describing the work environment at Toyota. The second interview 
assesses the candidate’s technical skills and potential. For this purpose, two 
written tests are given. One, lasting two hours, evaluates general knowledge. 
A second, lasting six hours, evaluates knowledge of  tool and die or general 
maintenance, and is given only to those candidates applying for a skilled trade. 
The next two interviews are conducted at the Toyota Motor Manufacturing 
facilities. The first one assesses interpersonal and decision-making  skills. It 
includes two sets of testing. One, lasting four hours, evaluates group and indi- 
vidual problem-solving  abilities. The second one, given only to production 
applicants, lasts five hours and simulates a production assembly. The second 
interview assesses the applicant’s achievements and accomplishments. This in- 
terview lasts one hour and is conducted in a group. 
The next phase, a physical evaluation, takes place at the Scott County Gen- 
eral Hospital and University of Kentucky Medical Center. Each applicant is 
given a two-and-a-half-hour physical examination that includes drug and alco- 
hol tests. 
The final phase of  the hiring process includes on-the-job observation and 
coaching that lasts for six months after the candidate has been hired. This last 
phase evaluates the candidate’s performance and further develops skills. 144  Masanori Hashimoto 
Appendix C 
Wages and BeneJits at Honda of  America 
Manufacturing, Inc. (HAM) 
The following information was summarized from Honda: Wages and BeneBts, 
published by Honda of America Manufacturing. 
Total Compensation 
Base Hourly Wage. This is the regular hourly wage received by all production, 
maintenance  and office clerical associates, exclusive of  shift premiums and 
overtime. 
Attendance Bonus.  This bonus is paid for perfect attendance for all regularly 
scheduled hours during any consecutive four week period. To be eligible, asso- 
ciates must also clock in and clock out according to company policy. 
Bonus Sharing. The Bonus Sharing Program rewards associates for their con- 
tinuing productivity  and efficiency with a bonus based upon Honda’s world- 
wide corporate income. Bonus sharing amounts will vary from year to year 
depending in part on Honda earnings worldwide. 
History of Production Wages at HAM 
Table 4C.1  Base Hourly Wage for Production Associates after 24 Months 



























1991  14.95  15.25 
1992  15.45  15.65 
1993  15.85  16.20 
~ 
Production Wages  (October 7, 1993) 
Start  3 Months  6 Months  9 Months  12 Months  15 Months  I8 Months 
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Vision Care Program 
On November 1, 1990, HAM started offering a company-paid Vision Care 
Program for associates and their eligible dependents. Coverage includes vision 
examination, corrective lenses, frames, and contact lenses. 
Associate Stock Purchase Program 
Under this program, HAM associates may purchase shares of stock in Honda 
Motor Company in the form of American Depository Receipts (ADRs) with 
the convenience of payroll deduction. HAM will pay all broker’s fees incurred 
for Honda Company ADRs purchased through payroll deduction. The initial 
enrollment for the Associate Stock Purchase program began December 1990. 
Payroll deduction began in January 1991. 
Production Wages and Bonuses: Total Package 
The annual compensation package at HAM consists of 
Base hourly wage 
Attendance Bonus 
HAM Bonus Sharing 
The following calculation assumes a production associate with perfect atten- 
dance and 3 years of service as of  November 1993 (excluding shift premium 
and overtime). 
September 7, 1989  September 6, 1990  November 1993 
Base wage  $14.20/hour  $14.75/hour  $16.20/hour 
Attendance Bonus  .8O/hour (equivalent)  .95/hour  1  .OO/hour 
HAM Bonus Sharing*  .77/hour (equivalent)  .82/hour  .58/hour 
Total  $15.77/hour  $16.52/hour  17.78hour 
*paid in November 
In addition to wages and bonuses, HAM provides the following benefits and 
programs to eligible associates: 
Health Care and Insurance Plans 
Medical plan 
Post-retirement medical plan 




Short-term disability insurance 
Long-term disability insurance 146  Masanori Hashimoto 
Accidental death and dismemberment insurance 
Life insurance 
Retirement, Savings and compensation 
Pension plan 
401(k) savings plan 
Flexible spending account 
Shares of stock in Honda Motor Co. 
Stock purchase program 





Shift premium pay 
Jury duty pay 
Call back pay 
Reporting pay 
Other  Bene$ts  and Programs 
Associate Assistance Program 
Education Assistance Program 
Honda Product Purchase Program 
Sports centers 
Honda Federal Credit Union 
Service Center 
Associate Development Center 
Uniforms 
Safety glasses and safety shoes subsidies 
Special year-end attendance gift 
Family Festival 
Associate service awards 
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